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Summary
Many Americans donate little or nothing to charity, but according to Robert Cooter
and Brian Broughman, our social environment is the cause, not human nature. They
propose a small policy change to increase transparency and elicit generosity inspired by
experimental evidence about the nature of giving.
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In 1997 Vice President Al Gore and his wife gave $353 to charity from 
income of $197,729, or 0.2 percent of income.  The mean contribution in their 
income bracket is ten times higher or 2.0 percent.
Commentators groaned that the Gores ought to set a better example.  
Americans need it. Recent polls show that approximately 30 percent of American 
households, including many with high incomes, donate nothing.  Most people 
who do contribute give less than one percent of their annual income, despite 
religious and cultural traditions that require much more.
These facts seem to confirm the standard economic assumption that people 
are narrowly self-interested.  Experimental evidence, however, shows that people 
behave generously in the right circumstances.  Instead of being inalterable traits, 
generosity and stinginess respond to the social environment.  Unfortunately, our 
system of anonymous charity stifles generosity. 
After public criticism, the Gore family increased its charitable giving the 
next year from 0.2 to 6.8 percent of income.  The fact that the Gores disclosed 
their charitable contributions, however, is unusual.  Most people keep such 
information private.  Although few Americans are under the level of public 
scrutiny that the Gores were, many Americans would be more generous if other 
people observed their level of giving.  
The state is well placed to give the missing information to the public. 
Taxpayers should be able to disclose information from their tax returns.  
Specifically, taxpayers should be able to direct the IRS to post to the Internet their 
ratio of charitable contributions to income.  Disclosure on the “donation registry” 
would be voluntary as a matter of law, but subject to social pressure.   If the state 
enables disclosure, social norms will do the rest and donations will increase 
dramatically.
The Nonprofit Sector
In 2003 nonprofits received over $240 billion in private donations, and 
over 18 billion hours of volunteer labor.  Combining donations with sales of 
goods and government grants, nonprofit organizations account for nearly six 
percent of U.S. national income. The nonprofit sector provides a broad range of 
social goods, including poverty relief, education, medical services, scientific 
research, art, and religion.  
1Cooter and Broughman: Charity, Publicity, and the Donation Registry
Brought to you by | Indiana University School of Law
Authenticated | 129.79.132.117
Download Date | 1/2/13 5:02 PM
In supplying social goods, charities have several advantages over the state.  
First, being voluntary, donations distort incentives less than taxes.  Second, being 
focused, many donors monitor performance of charities, rewarding good 
performance and punishing bad performance.  Third, the state’s majoritarian 
politics fails to supply the mix of social goods required by a diverse population.  
According to Burton Weisbrod, an economist at Northwestern University, as the 
population of a democracy diversifies, charities should expand and fill gaps in the 
state’s supply of social goods. 
Charity’s Problem: Publicity
Given its importance, economists should develop mechanisms to increase 
charitable giving. Instead of tax deductions, which are the typical prescription, 
economists should take inspiration from behavioral experiments that link charity 
to information.  In a typical public goods experiment a group of four or more 
subjects receive “tokens” for money.  A subject can either keep her entire 
allocation of tokens or contribute some to a public good that is shared with the 
other players.  In the usual experimental design, the group’s payoff is maximized 
when each subject contributes all her tokens to the public good, but contributing 
nothing and free riding maximizes the individual’s payoff.  A narrowly self-
interested player will keep all of her tokens, while an altruistic person will 
contribute to the public good.  
The results of these experiments reveal principles of charitable giving.  
First, when an individual’s contribution is anonymous and unobservable by other 
participants or the experimenter, she will make a significantly smaller 
contribution than when others can observe her behavior.  Anonymity stifles 
generosity, while publicity encourages it.
Second, subjects contribute less when they are unable to communicate.  
Isaac and Walker gave subjects the opportunity to talk with each other before 
deciding how much to contribute.  The other participants could not observe the 
actual investment by each subject.  Still, conversation increased contributions.  
Communication reinforces a norm of cooperation.
Third, contributions are higher if subjects can punish free riders.  In a 
public goods experiment, Fehr and Gächter let players observe the contribution of 
each participant.  Based on this observation, subjects could punish a participant by 
reducing her payoff.  Doing so, however, costs the punisher and was not in her 
self-interest.  Regardless, the mere threat of punishment increases contribution 
levels.  
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Applying these results, the social environment of the U.S is ideal to elicit 
stinginess.   First, donations are often anonymously made from the privacy of 
one’s home. Charities, who understand the importance of publicity, publish lists 
of donors by contribution level and use fundraising events to increase visibility.  
Yet these charities do not know a person’s total giving to all charities. Except for 
some public officials like Al Gore, the level of total giving by each individual is 
unknown.   
Second, few Americans discuss their donations with each other.  If people 
discussed their donations concretely, they would reach more agreement over 
whether, say, three percent is enough or too little.  For a clear standard of civic 
obligation to emerge, discussions of charity must move from the abstract to the 
concrete.
Third, because we cannot identify them, free riders escape social 
sanctions.  This problem especially afflicts obligations that are “disjunctive” 
rather than “conjunctive.”   To illustrate the difference, we are obligated to make a 
donation to “A or B or C or ….” In contrast, the duty not to lie or cheat or steal 
applies to “A and B and C and ….” Whether instances of the obligation are linked 
by “or” or “and” affects free-riding.  Establishing violations of a conjunctive 
obligation requires a single observation.  In contrast, detecting a violation of a 
disjunctive obligation requires aggregate information. To illustrate concretely, a 
university might disclose individual donations in its alumni magazine.  We cannot 
conclude, however, that an unlisted alumnus is uncharitable, because he may have 
donated generously to another cause.    For disjunctive obligations, preventing 
free-riding requires aggregate information, which in turn requires some 
centralization of information.   
Available data in the U.S. and other countries confirms the dismal 
predictions suggested by these facts about charitable contributions.  Using IRS 
data, Figure 1 shows the average ratio of contributions to income for itemizing 
taxpayers. The average itemizer donated 3.2 percent of annual income. While 
extensive, the data in Figure 1 is biased, because approximately 65 percent of 
taxpayers do not itemize. Non-itemizers typically donate a smaller portion of their 
income, causing Figure 1 to overstate contributions.  The average non-itemizer 
donated 1.5 percent of annual income.  
Average behavior is not typical behavior.  As figure 2 demonstrates, the 
median contribution is less than one percent, and almost a third of the population 
gives nothing.
3Cooter and Broughman: Charity, Publicity, and the Donation Registry
Brought to you by | Indiana University School of Law
Authenticated | 129.79.132.117
Download Date | 1/2/13 5:02 PM
Figure 1: Contribution Ratios from 2001 Tax Returns
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Figure 2: Distribution of Household Contribution Levels in 1998
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According to Figure 1, low-income itemizers donate a significantly higher 
proportion of income than high-income itemizers, but this fact is misleading.  
Unlike high-income taxpayers, most low-income taxpayers do not itemize and 
those who do have exceptionally large contributions.  This fact presumably 
explains away the regressivity in Figure 1.  When non-itemizers are included, a 
flat contribution ratio of approximately two percent is a reasonable estimate for all 
but the wealthiest Americans. Very wealthy households, those with income over 
$10 million, contribute a significantly higher ratio.
Surveys also show that religious people donate more money and time to 
charities than non-religious people.  Some religious organizations like the 
Mormons create an ideal environment to trigger generosity and they induce many 
members to tithe (give 10%).
The Solution: The Donation Registry
To increase donations, we propose that nonprofit organizations work with 
the IRS to create a donation registry on the Internet. The registry would publish 
the ratio of a person’s contributions to annual income, while keeping private the 
person’s absolute contributions and income.  Specifically, the IRS could add an 
optional box to the tax form authorizing disclosure. Disclosure would be 
voluntary. If the box is checked the IRS would automatically transmit to the 
donation registry the taxpayer’s name and her ratio of deductible contributions to 
adjusted gross income for the year.  A typical entry on the registry would look 
like this:
Tax Year Name Contribution Ratio
2004 John Doe 5%
Would anyone volunteer to be listed?  No doubt, some people may be 
reluctant to disclose out of modesty or a desire for financial privacy. To overcome 
reluctance, charities should apply social pressure to public figures such as 
politicians, business leaders, sports heroes, and actors. Charities should emphasize 
that disclosure demonstrates civic responsibility and encourages others.  Like Al 
Gore, public figures who do not disclose or give too little should be shamed. After 
public figures start to disclose, we envision a gradual spread to most taxpayers 
who itemize.  Organizations should aim for participation by their members in the 
donation registry much like they currently aim for participation in the United 
Way.
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Economic theory provides another reason why people would voluntarily 
list themselves. Those with high contributions will tend to list themselves, 
whereas those with low contributions will be reluctant to list themselves.  Thus a 
failure to list oneself will allow others to guess that one has low contributions. 
This fact may unravel the group that refuses and cause almost everyone to list 
themselves. In fact, this experiment was recently conducted in our law school 
with regard to teaching ratings. Just as the theory predicts, all but one teacher 
chose to list his or her ratings.
Behavioral studies find that contribution levels are twice as high when 
donations can be observed as compared to complete anonymity. The donation 
registry should significantly increase donations, possibly doubling them.  Even a 
modest increase in the average donation will significantly increase funding for 
social goods.  For example, if the mean contribution ratio were increased by half 
of one percent (from 2.1 to 2.6 percent) this would result in approximately $50 
billion in additional revenue for charitable organizations. 
Refinements and Extensions
Alternate methods could be used alongside the registry to encourage 
donations.  For instance the IRS could send a ‘challenge letter’ to each taxpayer 
who did not disclose over the registry.  The challenge letter would compare the 
individual’s donations to the contributions of others in the same income bracket.
Our concept can also encompass volunteering.  For example, the 
American Bar Association recommends that lawyers perform at least 50 hours of 
volunteer legal services for clients of limited financial means each year.  A 
volunteer registry could publicize pro bono work by lawyers or by law firms.  The 
‘pro bono registry’ would disclose which lawyers (and which firms) actually live 
up to the ABA standard, and would use publicity to encourage higher levels of 
volunteering. In fact, some states have adopted pro bono reporting requirements.  
In Florida, for instance, lawyers are required to report each year whether or not 
they have performed pro bono service or, alternatively, provided direct financial 
support to nonprofit legal service providers.  According to Talbot D’Alemberte,
former president of the American Bar Association, Florida’s reporting program 
has significantly increased volunteering and monetary contributions by its 
lawyers. Doctors, accountants, and many other groups could establish similar 
volunteer registries.
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Conclusion
Conservatives and liberals often share the belief that more social goods 
require higher taxes.  They are wrong.  More donations could finance more social 
goods without increasing taxes or expanding state bureaucracy.  Economists 
should use experimental findings to design policies that elicit more donations to 
pay for more social goods. The first requirement is to publicize donations by 
individuals.  For this purpose, the IRS should add a check box on income tax 
forms for the taxpayer to consent to publishing the ratio of contributions to 
adjusted gross income. The donation registry would make the contribution ratio of 
individuals observable to the public, provoke concrete discussion about charitable 
obligations, and facilitate social sanctions for shirkers.  The aim is to develop a 
civic standard of responsible giving to supplement the religious standards of 
particular faiths.  With a little state action, social norms will do the rest. 
Robert Cooter is the Herman F. Selvin Professor of Law, and Director of the 
Berkeley Center for Law, Business and the Economy at Boalt Hall School of Law 
at the University of California Berkeley.  He is a founder and past president of the 
American Law and Economics Association, and in 1999 was elected to the 
American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
Brian Broughman is a graduate student in the department of Jurisprudence and 
Social Policy at the University of California Berkeley.
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